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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRED BAUGH an<l GRACE H.
BAUGH, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

"TA YNE D. CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the State of Utah,
Defendant,

No.

10786

LOGAN RIVER WATER USERS'
ASSOCIATION,
Intervenor and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
In February of 1950 appellants' predecessor m
interest filed a request with the State Engineer for an
extension of time within which to resume the use of a
decreed water right. This request was subsequently
granted. In February of 1955 the State Engineer, after
giving notice that proof of resumption of use was due,
1

advised the applicant that the water right was forfeited
for failure to submit proof of resumption of use. This
action was filed in 1964 to determine the validity of
this water right.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court held that the right had been forfeited.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant and intervenor submit that the decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the documentary evidence in this case was
contained on the application for extension of time within which to resume use of water. This is Application
No. 38 on the records in the State Engineer's office
(Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). Appellants have set
forth some of the documents contained on this file but
there are others that are also necessary to the resolution
of this matter which are not referred to in appellants'
statement of facts. Respondents submit that the following is a more correct and complete statement of the
facts contained on Defendants' Exhibit No. 3 and these
facts are set forth in chronological order:
Application for extension of time within which
to resume the use of water evidenced by Award
2

No. 228 in the case of Utah Power & Light Co.
v. Richmond Irrigation Co., was filed by Logan
Flour .Mills, Inc., February 15, 1950, stating
water was last used on January 12, 1946, and
requesting an extension to and including J anuary 1, 1955 within which to again resume the use
of water under this right. The applicant stated
that this extension was necessary because its
flour mill had been destroyed by fire and the
applicant needed additional time to obtain financing to rebuild the mill.
This application, Number 38, on the records
of the State Engineer, was approved May 23,
1 !)50 and an extension granted to and including
.January 1, 1955.
On October 27, 1954 the State Engineer, by
registered mail, advised applicant that the extension of time would expire January 1, 1955.
A letter dated November 19, 1954 was received in the State Engineer's office from
Crowther Bros. Milling Company, stating they
now owned this water right and requesting additional information in connection with proof of
resumption of use.
The State Engineer, by letter dated November

30, 1954, adYised Crowther Bros. Milling Com-

pany that proof of resumption of use in affidavit
form would have to be submitted on or before
January 1, 1955 or that a new application for
additional time be filed. The State Engineer
also advised Crowther Bros. that it would be
necessary to submit evidence of ownership of the
right.
On December 31. 19.54 the State Engineer
received a letter dated December 29, 1964 from
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Crowther Bros. Milling Company advising him
that electrical equipment had been installed and
that they would be utilizing water for generation
of power. This letter also stated that: "This
will actually be running on the thirtieth." The
letter gave a description of the property contained in the deed from Logan Flour Mills tu
Crowther Bros. Milling Company. However, the
deed was not submitted with this letter.
The Attorney General's office by letter dated
January 8, 1955 advised Crowther Bros. Milling
Company that the submission of a verified statement setting forth the date on which the use of
water was resumed was mandatory under the
statute. The letter further advised the Company
that when proof of resumption of use was not
submitted the water right ceased and reverted
to the public and the State Engineer could only
endorse his records accordingly.
The State Engineer received a letter from
Crowther Bros., dated February 3, 1955 stating
that: "For your informaton, we put the power
into beneficial use for generating electric power
for Logan City on December 31, 1954, and it
has been in operation ever since."
Proof of resumption of use on a form provided by the State Engineer was received in the
office of the State Engineer February 10, 1955.
On February 17, 1955 the State Engineer
directed a letter jointly to Logan Flour Mills
and Crowther Bros. Milling Company, advising
the parties that the right evidenced by Award
No. 228 had been forfeited because the applicant
failed to submit proof of resumption of use as
required by Section 73-1-4, U.C.A., 1953. and
that he cmild not accept proof of resumption of
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use after the proof due date had elapsed. The
State Engineer further stated that unless an
appeal was taken within 60 days the decision
of the State Engineer would in all probability
be final, and that the typed copy of a deed whici1
was received on February 5, 1955 was not sufficient to endorse his records to show the ownership of this right by the Crowther Bros. Milling
Company.
On February 24, 1955 the State Engineer received a certified copy of the deed transferring
ownership of this right from Logan Flour Mills
to Crowther Bros. Milling Company.
The State Engineer, by letter dated February
28, 1955 again stated that the right had been
forfeited and that if the applicant desired to
review the Engineer's February 17th decision
an appeal would have to be taken to the District
Court within 60 days of that decision.
A letter was received by the State Engineer
on March 2, 1955 from Crowther Bros. Milling
Company stating the water had been put to use
a.nd asking the Engineer to reconsider his decis10n.
On March 7, 1955 the State Engineer again
advised the applicant that he could not reconsider his decision and that the applicant must
seek a timely review of the Engineer's decision
of February 17, 1955.
The Crowther Bros. Milling Company subsequently
initiated a ne''' water right for use in this plant. Application to Appropriate No. 26793 (Defendants' Exhibit
No. 4) was filed March rn, 19.55 by Crowther Bros.
Milling Company and sought to appropriate 87 second-
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feet of water for power generation. The State Engineer approved this filing for 71.5 second-feet and it
is presently in good standing in the Engineer's office.
While it was stipulated (Tr. 3 and 4) that on
December 30 and 31, 1954 power was being generated
at appellants' plant, respondents deny that there is any
competent evidence in the record as to the quantity of
water diverted. The testimony of Junius Crowther
(Tr. 6) which is cited on page 8 of appellants' brief
as evidence of the fact that sixty to sixty-five feet of
water went through the generators, was stricken on
cross examination when this witness testified his opinion
was based on information furnished him by an engineer
rather than his own judgment (Tr. 9).
This same information was again elicited on redirect examination (Tr. 10 and 11). However, on
recross the witness admitted his opinion was based on
information furnished him later by an engineer and
absent that information he had no opinion (Tr. 11).
Another motion was made to strike his testimony (Tr.
12) and the court took this motion under advisement
(Tr. 13). The engineer referred to by Mr. Crowther
was later called as a witness by appellant and testified
that he did not recall making any measurements at the
power plant until December 3, 1960 (Tr. 24). This
was approximately six years after Mr. Crowther observed this initial flow of water into the power plant.
Mr. Jibson, the engineer who made the measurement,
further testified that Mr. Crowther was not present
when he made his measurements in 1960 (Tr. 24) .
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It appears that appellants' position in this matter
raises three general questions. First, whether the forfeiture statute was applicable at all in this fact situation
and, secondly, if the statute was applicable did the
appropriator comply with it. And, finally, whether
the State Engineer's decision holding that the right
had been forfeited for failure to submit proof was
beyond his authority and, therefore, void. \Ve will discuss these questions in this order.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-1-J,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, ARE APPLICABLE \VHERE THE l\IEANS OF BENEFICIALLY USING A \VATER RIGHT HATE
BEEN DESTROYED HY FIRE AND THE
O\VNER OF THE RIGHT DOES NOT RESUl\IE THE USE OF \V ATER \VITHIN FIYE
YEARS OR REQUEST AN EXTENSION OF
TIME \VITHIN \VHICH TO RESUME THE
USE OF THE \VATER.
Appellants' position that the prov1s1011s of the
forfeiture statute do not apply to non use of water
resulting from fire is untenable. Appellants have pointed to 110 express exception in the statute and this is
simply because the statute makes no exceptions. Section 73-1-4<, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
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Such applications for extension shall be granted by the state engineer for periods not exceeding five years each, upon a showing of reasonable
cause for nonuse. Financial crisis, industrial
depression, operation of legal proceedings or
other unavoidable cause, . . . shall constitute
reasonable cause for such nonuse.
Application within which to resume use of water
No. 38 (Paragraph 14 of Defendants' Exhibit No. 3)
states that the water could no longer be used because
the Flour Mill had been destroyed by fire and it was
contemplated that a new modern mill would be built
as soon as possible. The applicant further stated difficulties in obtaining financing had prevented a rebuilding at the time the application was filed in 1950. This
situation is clearly within the purview of the forfeiture
statute. It was to avoid this very type of hardship that
the legislature provided for these extensions.
Nor do we believe there is any question as to when
the statute began to run as appellants suggest. The
statute expressly provides that when the appropriator
ceases to use the water its provisions apply. This relates
solely to when the beneficial use of the water stopped
and has nothing to do with when the fire goes out.
Application No. 38 recites that the water was last used
on January 12, 1946 as that was the morning the mill
burned down (Paragraph 12, Application No. 38 of
Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). However, the fact is
that within five years of the last use of this water right
the appropriator properly filed an application within
which to resume use. The applicant specifically re-
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quested an extension to .January 1, 1955 (Paragraph
1:3 of Application No. 38, Defendants' Exhibit No. 3)
which the State Engineer subsequently granted (Paragraph Hi of the State Engineer's endorsements on
Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). The appropriator elected
to take advantage of the provisions of this statute to
preserve his water right and he of all people should
be bound by this election.
Further, we submit that the cases cited by appellants do not stand for the broad proposition that there
must be a voluntary failure to use the water on the
part of the appropriator in order for a forfeiture to
oecur. The Utah Act certainly makes no such provision.
In the cases of New }}J erL'ico Products Co. v. New
Jfc,rico Power Company, 42 N. M. 311, 77 P. 2d 634
(1937) and 1lforris v. Bean, 146 F. 423 ( Hl06), the
water did not reach the appropriator because it was
rliYerted by an upstream user. The Utah statute expressly states that use by another user without a right
eauses a forfeiture of the water right. The case of
Scherck v. Nichols, 55 'Vyo. 4, 95 P. 2d 74 ( 1939),
was presented to the court on an abandonment theory.
There was no discussion of forfeiture. 'Ve will concede
that abandonment must be voluntary. In Rarnsa.IJ v.
Gottsche, 51 ~Tyo. 516, 69 P. 2d 535 (1937), floods
for a period of successive years destroyed the appropriator's ditches and dams so the water was no longer
arnila ble at his original point of diversion. However,
tlw court concluded that it was not necessary to condusiyely decide whether this was sufficient grounds
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for nonuse because there was evidence that the water
had been used during the period in question. In the
cases of Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln
Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P. 2d 572 (1939) and
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company v. Kents Lake Reservoir Company, 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108 (1943),
there was not sufficient natural flow in the stream to
satisfy the priority rights alleged to have been forfeited.
The court concluded that where the appropriator was
ready and able to use the water he could not be penalized because nature failed to supply it. We think these
situations are clearly distinguishable from this case.
Here the water was available at the appropriator's point
of diversion and could have been diverted at any time
had the mill been reconstructed. The appropriator
stated in the application to resume use that it was lack
of finances that prevented the use of this water. \Ve
would also like to point out that much of the discussion
concerning voluntary nonuse of water in the above
cases took place in connection with the court's discussion of abandonment rather than forfeiture. For·
feiture and abandonment are two distinct legal con· '
cepts.
The forfeiture of a water right under the Utah
statute occurs not as the result of any intention on the
part of the owner to forsake the right but rather it
comes about by failure to use the water for the period
prescribed by the statute. As this court has previously
noted the abandonment of a water right is based on
failure to use plus an intent to abandon. Promontory

10

Ranch Company v. Argile, 28 Utah 398, 79 Pac. 47
(1904) . However, forfeiture occurs absent an intent
to give up the right artid can be involuntary. This concept is noted in Hutchins, Selected Problems in the
Law of Water Rights in the West, United States Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication
No. 418 (1942) at page 395, wherein he quotes from
the then recent Utah case of Hammond v. Johnson,
94 Utah 20, 66 P. 2d 894 (1937):
And the Supreme Court of Utah recently stated:
Abandonment is not based upon a time element and mere nonuser will not establish abandonment for any less time, at least, than the
statutory period. The controlling element in
abandonment is a matter of intent. * * * * There
can be no abandonment of a water right unless
there is a concurrence of the acts of the party
with his intent to desert, forsake, or abandon
the right. A forfeiture for nonuser during the
statutory time may occur despite a specific intent
not to surrender the right. It is based not upon
an act done, or an intent had but upon a failure
to use the right for the statutory time.
Forfeiture, therefore, can be involuntary;
abandonment is necessarily voluntary and intentional.
The very purpose of the legislature in insuring the
continued beneficial use of water by a forfeiture statute
would be circumvented if the forfeiture had to be
voluntary. As stated by Kinney, in his work on Irri,!Jation and Water Rights (2d ed. 1912) Vol. 2 § 1120,
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when discussing the construction of statutes providing
for forfeiture of water rights:
These statutes fixing the maximum time limit
for the nonuser of a water right, where free from
ambiguity, should be strictly construed by the
courts. Such an act should be strictly construed,
and a case clearly made out before any relief
should be extended to the delinquent thereunder.
"When a statute gives a new and unusual remedy, and directs how the right to the remedy is
to be acquired or enjoyed, and how it is to be
enforced, the Act should be strictly construed;
and the validity of all acts done under the
authority of such an Act will depend upon the
compliance with its terms. In respect to such
Acts, the steps pointed out for the acquisition,
presen·ation, and enforcement of the remedies
provided should be construed as mandatory
rather than optional." Campbellsville Lumber
Co. v. Hubbert, 112 Fed. Rep. 718, 50 C.C.A.
435.

Under the law of this state when a water right
is forfeited and reverts to the public existing rights
on the stream are entitled to the distribution of this
increased supply.
Even though title were to revert to the public,
it is unlikely that it would be available for appropriation by filing with the State Engineer
for on practically every stream in this state there
are junior appropriators whose applications haYe
bee1~ approved by the State Engineer for a total
of more water than ordinarily is available in the
stream. The reversion of thi~ water would then
go to feed those rights of the junior appropriators. TVellsville East Field Irri. Co. v. Lindsay
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Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P. 2d
634 (1943).
The intervenor in this action does not claim to be
the owner of any water rights, it only exists to assist
its members who are water right owners in the distribution of their rights. Certainly the intervenor has
sufficient standing in this action to protect this interest
of its members since under the above announced rule
of law these users would be the beneficiaries of this
forfeiture.
POINT II.
WHEN THE APPLICANT FAILED TO
SUBMIT PROOF OF RESUMPTION OF USE
ON APPLICATION 'iVITHIN WHICH TO RESUME USE NO. 38 ON OR BEFORE JANUARY 1, 1955, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION
73-1-4, U.C.A., 1953, THE 'iV ATER RIGHT WAS
FORFEITED AS A MATTER OF LA,iV.
Turning now to the question of whether the applicant's action complied with the statutory requirements
of proof of resumption of use. Appellants' predecessor
failed to use water under this right for a period of
approximately nine years by taking advantage of the
provisions of Section 73-1-4. After having received
the benefits of this section appellants now seek to avoid
the obligations of the statute.
The portion of Section 73-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, dealing with proof of resumption of use
specifies that:
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, Sixty d_ays befo_re the expiration of any period
of ~~tension of. time, the State Engineer shall
notify the applicant by registered mail of the
date when such period of extension will expire.
Before such date of expiration such applica11t
shall file a verified statement with the State Engineer settin,q forth the date on which use of
water was resumed, and such further information as may be relevant and be required by the
blank form which shall be furnished by the State
Engineer for said purpose, or such applicant
shall make application for further extension of
time in which to resume use of water as provided
in this section, otherwise such water right shall
cease and thereupon the water shall revert to
the public. (Emphasis added).
The requirements of proof under this statute are
neither detailed nor complex. The submitting of a sworn
statement stating the date on which use was resumed
is not such a difficult task that a water user could not
understand it. Nor is the other information required
on the blank proof form furnished by the State Engineer. There is no claim the applicant did not understand what was required. Certainly there was sufficient
notice. The notice of State Engineer dated lVfoy 23,
1950 advising the applicant that the extension had been
granted also stated that proof of resumption of use
would be due January l, 1955 (Defendants' Exhibit
No. 3). Sixty days prior to the expiration of the exten·
sion period, the State Engineer, as required by statute,
gave the applicant notice of what was required in order
to submit proof of resumption of use and the consequences if a proper proof was not submitted. (Letter
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from the State Engineer dated October 27, 1954 ,on
Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). Again on November 30,
1954, (Letter from the State Engineer on Defendants'
Exhibit No. 3) the Engineer, after receiving an inquiry
from the purported new owner of the right, reiterated
the mandatory requirements of statute with regard to
a verified proof of resumption of use. This letter also
advised the party claiming ownership of the right that
proper evidence of ownership would have to be submitted.
The only thing filed with the State Engineer prior
to the proof due date of January 1, 1955 was a letter
from the purported new owner stating that he intended
to put the water to beneficial use on December 30, 1954.
The appropriator even failed to notify the Engineer
that use of the water was in fact resumed. Proof, on
the form provided by the State Engineer, was not submitted until February 10, 1955. This then is not a case
of an applicant making substantial compliance with a
statutory requirement and then later clearing up a
few technical points as appellants contend. The simple
fact is that this water right was lost because there was
a total and complete failure to comply with the requirements of the statute and not because of any arbitrary
action of the State Engineer. In effect appellants contend that the Engineer's action was void because he
required compliance with a legislative mandate. If the
court adopted appellants' reasoning in this matter
it would have to completely disregard the language
of this statute.

15

\:Ve submit that this situation is analogous to the

submission of proof of appropriation on an application ,
to appropriate. lf proof is not submitted the right is
lost. The Utah Supreme Court so held in the case of
Mosby lrrigation Co. v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 354
P. 2d 8"18 (1960) In that case the court ruled that when
the State Engineer gave the notice required by statute,
to the owner of the right as shown by the records in
his office, and proof was not submitted on the date due
the application lapsed.
The instant application lapsed by reason of
the Canal Company's failure to submit proof of
appropriation on the due date. It lapsed in accordance with the express mandate of the statute
and not because of action of any state officer.
Also see Duchesne County v. Humpherys, 106 Utah
332, 148 P. 2d 338 ( 1944). \Vhen the applicant failed
to submit proof of resumption of use the right was forfeited as a matter of law. If this is not the case, the
forfeiture statute in this state is a nullity.
POINT III.
IF THERE \:VAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE STATE ENGINEER IN HIS DECISION OF FEBRUARY
17, 1955, IN REFUSING TO ACCEPT PROOF
OF RESUlHPTION OF USE AFTER J ANU·
ARY l, 1955, IT \VAS MANDATORY FOR THE
APPLICANT TO TAKE AN APPEAL OF
THAT DECISION \VITHIN SIXTY DAYS.

16

1

Appellants spend considerable effort attempting
to develop the thesis that the State Engineer's action
in refusing to accept proof of resumption of use after
the proof due date had expired was void because (a)
the statute didn't authorize his action or (b) if it did
it was an unconstitutional attempt to delegate judicial
power to an administrative officer. We have discussed
the statutory requirements in this regard in some detail
under Point II and respectfully submit that this statute
does contemplate the State Engineer initially determining whether proof of resumption of use has been submitted and whether the proof is proper. Appellants concede that the Engineer has certain administrative
powers under this section but refuse to recognize that
he can exercise his discretion with regard to his responsibilities. We submit this argument is unsound as a
matter of administrative law and is certainly counter
to the express wording of the forfeiture statute.
Merely because a board or commission is a
body belonging to the executive or administrative body of the government, it by no means
follows that it may not perform functions which
are, in their nature, judicial, and possess and
exercise quasi-judicial powers. Statutes conferring quasi-judicial powers and duties upon administrative agencies have been held not to be
unconstitutional as encroachments upon the judicial branch of government, especially where
such powers and duties relate to matters which
are peculiarly affected with public interest or
are subject to regulation under police power~,
or where provision is made for appeal from dec1-
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sions of such agencies to the courts. 2 Am. J ur.
2d, Administrative Law, § 145.

Section 73-1-4 allows the Engineer to prepare a
proof form which requires the appropriator to submit
additional relevant information. In this case the appro·
priator not only failed to submit the formal proof, he
even neglected to submit the verified statement stating
the date that use had begun which the statute expressly
required.
We have never claimed the Engineer was clothed
with judicial powers to adjudicate water rights. The
cases which appellants cite for the proposition that
the Engineer cannot exercise judicial powers simply
aren't relevant. This is not a case where the Engineer
set himself up as a court to make a water right adjudication. As we have already pointed out above the
statute provides what shall happen when proof of '
resumption of use is J)Ot submitted. The right ceases.
The Engineer's action was limited solely to the question
of whether or not proper proof of resumption of use
had been submitted (State Engineer's decision dated ,
February 17, 1955 on Defendants' Exhibit No. 3).
The Engineer advised the appropriator that what had
been submitted did not comply with the statute and
that he could not accept proof after the proof due date
had elapsed. Appellants' reasoning would require the
State Engineer to accept whatever the applicant wants
to submit in the way of proof and rubber stamp it as
proper. However, we submit that it is a fundamental
responsibility of the Engineer to review the proof and
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to reject it if it does not comply with the statute. 'Ve
do not see any valid grounds for classing this action
as a decision beyond the State Engineer's authority.
For purposes of argument under this point only
and without conceding appellants' contention that there
was substantial compliance with the proof requirements
of the forfeiture statute, applicant's failure to appeal
the State Engineer's decision of February 17, 1955,
within the time allowed for such appeals precludes the
appellants from questioning it some nine years later.
The legislature has provided the exclusive procedure
for review of the State Engineer's decisions where a
party believes the Engineer has abused his discretion.
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states:
In any case where a decision of the State Engineer is involved any person aggrieved by such
decision may within sixty days after notice
thereof bring a civil action in the district court
for a plenary review thereof.
The State Engineer's decision specifically advised
the appropriator that an appeal must be taken within
this sixty-day period. In response to subsequent requests by the applicant to reconsider his action the
Engineer on two separate occasions again advised the
appropriator that he could not reconsider this matter
and that the applicant must appeal the Engineer's
1lecision if he believed the Engineer had abused his
discretion (Letters dated February 28, 1955 and March
7. 1955 on Defendants' Exhibit No. 3).
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This court has held that the statutory procedure
is the exclusive method for reviewing a decision of the ,
State Engineer, Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 189
P. 2d 701 ( 1948) . In another early decision involving
an appeal of a decision of the State Engineer, this court
also announced that the appeal must be taken within
the sixty day time limit. In re Application 7600, 63
Utah 311, 225 Pac. 605 (1924).
Section 73-3-14 is jurisdictional m nature and
unless the appeal is taken within the time specified
the court is without jurisdiction to review the admiuistrator's decision.
The statutes governing many administrative
agencies or the rules of the court in which review
is sought provide a definite time within which
a proceeding for review may be instituted. Such
time requirements generally must be complied
with, application for review within the time
specified in the statute being regarded as jurisdictional and a proceeding not prosecuted with·
in the time allowed may be dismussed. 2 Am.
Jur. 2d, Administrative Law,§ 718.
In a case involving an appeal under the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act which provided for an
appeal within 30 days after the date of an adverse order
of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Federal Court sus·
tained the dismissal of an appeal taken after the 30
days had elapsed for lack of jurisdiction.
The complainant has moved to dismiss. the
appeal on the ground that it was not filed w1thlll
the thirty day period required by Section 7 ( cI
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?f the Act, 7 ~.S.C.A. § 499 g(c). Of course,
if the appeal is not timely, this court has no
jurisdiction to entertain it. American Fruit

Growers, Inc. v. Lewis D. Goldstein Fruit &
Produce Corp., 78 F. S. 309 ( 1948) .

In another case which involved an appeal under
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law, the Federal
Court in interpreting the requirement of taking an
appeal within the time specified in the statute stated:
Litigants cannot trifle with Article 8307,
Section 5. It goes beyond the ordinary statute
of limitation. Its requirements are jurisdictional.

Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company,
256 F. 2d 35 (1958).

If there was an abuse of discretion on the part of
the State Engineer in his decision of February 17,
1955 appellants are now foreclosed from questioning
it. Parties cannot sleep on their right of appeal and
then at some late date come forth with the declaration
that the decision of the State Engineer is void in
order to get into court. If this were allowed there would
never be a final decision of an administrative officer.

The owner of the Award No. 228 obviously thought
the decision was final because a new application to
appropriate water (Application No. 26793, Defendants' Exhibit No. 4) was filed on March 16, 1955. This
filing was subsequently approved and is presently m
good standing in the office of the State Engineer.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the evidence in this case we submit '
that the provisions of Section 73-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, were applicable when appellants' predecessor ceased the use of this water. Further, when proof
of resumption of use was not submitted as required
by the statute this water right was forfeited as a matter
of law. The State Engineer clearly had the discretion
and responsibility of advising the appropriator that
he had failed to submit proof on time and that he could
not accept proof of resumption of use after the proof ~
due date had expired. However, if there was one abuse
of the Engineer's discretion in the matter, it was mandatory that an appeal be taken within sixty days.
Appellants are now foreclosed from reviewing the
State Engineer's action in this matter.
1

Respect£ ully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DALLIN ,V. JENSEN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Respondent
Utah State Engineer
DAYID R. DAINES
Attorney for Respondent
Logan River Water Users' Association
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